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Medical unexplained symptomsObjective: Functional neurological symptoms (FNS) are hypothetically explained as a shift of emotion processing
to sensorimotor deﬁcits, but psychophysiological evidence supporting this hypothesis is scarce. The present
study measured neuromagnetic and somatic sensation during emotion regulation to examine frontocortical
and sensorimotor activity as signals of altered emotion processing.
Methods: Magnetoencephalographic (MEG) activity was mapped during an emotion regulation task in 20
patients with FNS and 20 healthy comparison participants (HC). Participants were instructed to (A) passively
watch unpleasant or neutral pictures or (B) down-regulate their emotional response to unpleasant pictures uti-
lizing cognitive reappraisal strategies. Group- and task-speciﬁc cortical activity was evaluated via 8–12 Hz
(alpha) powermodulation, while modulation of somatic sensation wasmeasured via perception and discomfort
thresholds of transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation.
Results: Implementing emotion regulation strategies induced frontocortical alpha power modulation in HC but
not in patients, who showed prominent activity modulation in sensorimotor regions. Compared to HC, discom-
fort threshold for transcutaneous stimulation decreased after the task in patients, who also expressed increased
symptom intensity.
Conclusions:Reduced frontocortical, but enhanced sensorimotor involvement in emotion regulation efforts offers
a trace to modeling a conversion of (aversive) feelings into (aversive) somatic sensations in FNS.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Paralysis, paresis, or numbness of body parts without neurological/
medical explanation are assigned to Functional Neurological Symptoms
(FNS; [1,2]). FNS are seen in individuals receiving diagnoses of conver-
sion or dissociative disorders (e.g. ICD, DSM). Various labels [1] and var-
ious hypotheses on the origin of thesemedically unexplained symptoms
may reﬂect the still poorly understood nature of a complex psychophys-
iological disorder. Links between FNS and intense negative emotions
have been assumed since Hippocrates and Plato (cf. [3]). They coined
FNS as ‘hysteria’ to delineate a pathological relation between emotion
and any bodily responses. Charcot attributed FNS to ‘functional brain
lesions’ associated with ‘psychic trauma’. Freud (cf. [3,4]) speciﬁed
‘functional lesions’ as disturbed cerebral dynamics: This, together with
unconscious repression of negative experiences was described as
fostering a conversion of intra-psychic conﬂicts into physical symptoms.University of Konstanz, P.O. Box
ess),
idt@kliniken-schmieder.de
. This is an open access article underFreud explained this conversion as a ‘defensemechanism’. Different from
conversion, Janet proposed dissociation of psychoform (i.e. cognitive)
and/or somatoform (i.e. physical; cf. [3,5–7]) processes consequent
upon an interplay of adverse experience(s) and individual predisposition.
Redirection of emotion expression in bodily symptoms upon (emotional)
stress has been emphasized again in recentmodels and deﬁnitions of FNS
[8,9]. Currentmodels vary in their emphasis on the impact of intense neg-
ative emotions (eventually upon trauma) in the genesis of FNS [3,5,7].
Prominent alexithymia in FNS, i.e. the inability to identify or describe
one's own feelings [10,11] has been suggested as indexing altered
emotion processing in patients suffering from FNS. Yet, this delineation
does not inform how intense emotion ‘converts’ into bodily symptoms.
Compromised neuronal emotion processing in patients with FNS is
suggested by augmented (fronto) cortical activity [8,12] and less
habituation of amygdala activity [12,13] in response to emotionally
salient stimuli. In addition, impaired emotion recognition has been
reported [12,14,15]. Vuilleumier [7] discussed deﬁcient motor exe-
cution as a possible consequence of altered connectivity between
(hyperactive) ventromedial prefrontal, precuneus and limbic struc-
tures, and (hypoactive) sensorimotor structures. Altered affective and
sensory representations are accompanied by efﬁcient awareness of
emotional states [7,13,16–18]. Each change in emotion perceptionthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
478 J. Fiess et al. / Journal of Psychosomatic Research 79 (2015) 477–483might also interfere with processes that individuals use to control
“which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they
experience and express these emotions”, i.e., with emotion regulation
([19, p. 275, 20]; and see below).
Different theories of emotion propose a close relationship between
the perception of bodily changes and emotion processing [21,22].
Perez and colleagues [23] emphasized “alterations in neurocircuits
mediating emotional processing, regulation and awareness, […]
and perceptual awareness” (p. 9). Regarding body sensation, patients
with FNS displayed diminished accuracy of heartbeat discrimination
(i.e. visceral sensitivity [24]). However, perception of such visceral
signals does not capture somatic sensation such as touch or pain.
More proximal to somatic sensation, transcutaneous electrical nerve
stimulation (TENS) measures the sensory perception threshold and
the individual discomfort threshold [25]. Nevertheless, perception of
physical symptoms may be biased by body-focused attention and par-
ticular attention on illness-related information [26–28], thus individual
discomfort threshold should be taken into account, when evaluating
somatic sensation in patients with FNS.
The present study addressed the potential links between emotion
processing, somatic sensations, and FNS by mapping electromagnetic
activity during a standard emotion regulation task in participants with
FNS and healthy comparison subjects (HC). Instruction-induced emo-
tion regulation usually prompts a decrease of the late positive event-
related potential (LPP) amplitude relative to the automatic response
to emotionally salient stimuli [29–33].Using high spatio-temporal reso-
lution magnetoencephalography (MEG) Popov et al. [34] showed that a
task-induced decrease in frontocortical 8–12Hz (alpha) power,which is
associated with readiness for information processing ([34], cf. [35,36]),
varied systematically with both the processing of emotional salience
and the down-regulation of emotional responses to aversive pictures
by cognitive reappraisal. If FNS are related to altered emotion regula-
tion, patients with FNS should show more alexithymia and less task-
induced modulation of frontocortical alpha power than participants
without FNS (HC). If altered emotion processing was related to an em-
phasis on bodily, sensorimotor processing, neuronal networks associat-
edwith sensorimotor functions should be activated in patientswith FNS
more than in HC. If sensorimotor activity was involved in (abnormal)
emotion regulation, perception/discomfort thresholds of somatic sensa-
tion should be altered in patients with FNS compared to HC. In parallel,




The study included twenty inpatients of the local rehabilitation cen-
ter (Kliniken Schmieder) with an ICD diagnosis of dissociative disorder
(ICD-codes F44.4, F44.6, F44.7) and 20 healthy comparison subjects
(HC). Diagnoses were given by at least two experienced psychiatrists
and neurologists following standard ICD-10 guidelines. Patients wereTable 1




Age (M± SD) 42.2 ± 13.6
Years schooling (M± SD) 10.6 ± 3.3
SDQ-20 (median (IQR)) 33.5 (28.25–41)
TAS-26 (median (IQR)) 48.5 (41.5–52)
Note. FNS = functional neurological symptoms; HC = healthy control subjects; SDQ-20 = FN
Alexithymia Scale.
⁎⁎⁎: p b .001; IQR = interquartile range.assigned to the study when they displayed at least one prominent
(negative) functional neurological symptom (FNS; i.e., negative
somatoform dissociative symptom, such as motor disorders or
hypesthesia). Seventeen patients suffered from motor weakness on
the left and 12 on the right side of body. Left-sided sensory disturbance
was reported by 15 and right-sided by 11 patients with FNS. There was
no difference in laterality of symptoms, i.e. between left- and right-
sided motor weakness and left- and right-sided sensory disturbances,
respectively. HC were recruited from the local community using
ﬂyers and oral advertising, and screened with the Mini International
Neuropsychiatric Interview [37] to exclude any psychiatric disorder.
For all participants, exclusion criteria were any history of a central ner-
vous lesion or disorders (e.g. epilepsy or degenerative disorders).
Groups did not differ with respect to mean age, gender distribution or
years of school education (see Table 1). All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. According to a standard handedness
inventory, one patient with FNS and one HC were left-handed, 17
patients with FNS and 19 HC were right-handed [38].
Prior to the experimental session, participants were informed about
the study design and procedures and signed written informed consent.
Then, sociodemographic data were assessed together with information
about the clinical status: type and severity of symptoms, alexithymia
as feature of emotion processing, general psychological strain and
comorbid psychopathology. Symptom severity was veriﬁed with the
Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ-20; [39]; German
Version by [40]; scores range from 20 to 100). As expected, patients
with FNS experienced somatoform dissociation during the preceding
twelve months more frequently than HC. In addition, patients were
characterized by their general psychological strain and comorbid
psychopathology using the Symptom Check List Revised (SCL-90-R;
[41–43]; see Supplemental Table 1 and Supplemental Fig. 1). Comorbid
psychopathology was considered relevant for data analyses if the re-
spective symptom score exceeded 2 SD of the mean of a normative
healthy group (normative data for the German version of the SCL-90-
R, N = 2141; [44]). Characteristic emotion processing was delineated
by alexithymia and assessed with the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-
26; [45–47]). Patients with FNS showed a higher alexithymia score
than HC, although only three patients reached the cutoff of an increased
alexithymia score (≥54; [48,49]).
Procedure and materials
The study design was approved by the ethics committee of the
University of Konstanz. Fig. 1 provides a schematic overview of the
3-hour experimental session, comprising the following steps:
(1) & (7) Individual FNS intensitywas assessed using an eleven-point
Likert-scale ranging from (0) ‘no symptoms’ to (10) ‘maximum
intensity’. Assumptions of normal distribution were not fulﬁlled,
and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were therefore used to analyze the
FNS intensity change score (before and after the emotion regulation
task).HC Patients with FNS vs. HC
20
10/10 n. s.
48.9 ± 12.4 n. s.
11.1 ± 1.5 n. s.
21 (20–22.75) U= 9.5, z=−5.19⁎⁎⁎, r=−0.82
36 (30.25–41.5) U= 65.5, z=−3.64⁎⁎⁎, r=−0.58
S severity veriﬁed using the Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire; TAS-26 = Toronto
Fig. 1. Session overview: (1) Pre-task assessment of individual symptom intensity on an 11-point Likert scale, (2) instruction and training of cognitive reappraisal strategy for the later
emotion regulation task, (3) pre-task assessment of somatic sensation (TENS: transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation), (4) emotion regulation task with MEG-monitoring,
(5) post-task somatic sensation assessment (TENS), (6) debrieﬁng on emotion regulation strategies used during (4), (7) post-task symptom intensity rating.
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with neutral of aversive content would be presented in the experi-
mental task ((4) in Fig. 1). They were instructed that upon A
(anschauen, watch) they should passively pay attention to the pic-
ture that would appear after the letter disappeared, while upon R
(regulieren, regulate), they should implement their individual,
trained and practiced strategies. Examples of potential strategies
were given (like “This is not a real scene, this is a movie,” or “The in-
jured person is about to be rescued.”), and the individually preferred
strategy was inquired. Several practice runs were implemented,
after which participants were asked to verbalize, which strategies
they used and found efﬁcient.
(3) & (5) Somatic sensationwasmeasured by transcutaneous electri-
cal nerve stimulation (TENS) with a frequency set to 100 Hz and
pulse duration ﬁxed at 150 μs. The 5 × 5-cm self-adhesive electrodes
were placed on left forearmover the distal radial bone near thewrist
joint. Stimulus intensitywas increased in steps of 1mAuntil the par-
ticipant perceived any (tingling) sensation (perception threshold).
Next, the stimulus intensity was increased until the participant ex-
perienced the sensation as uncomfortable (discomfort threshold),
uponwhich stimulationwas stopped (see [25]). For hypothesis test-
ing, difference scores before and after the emotion regulation task
were calculated for the two levels of intensity (i.e., (a) perception
and (b) discomfort threshold), and then compared between groups.
Assumptions of normal distribution were not fulﬁlled; group
differences were thus analyzed by Mann–Whitney U-tests and the
difference between the measurements was analyzed by Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests.
(4) The emotion regulation task involved a stimulus set of 70 unpleas-
ant, highly arousing and 70 neutral, less-arousing colored images
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; [50]). All
stimuli were presented via a projection system on a screen about
70 cm from the subject's eye. Across 210 trials stimulus presentation
varied with three conditions, passive attending to neutral (neutral
watch, NW) or unpleasant pictures (unpleasant watch, UW) and
regulating emotion to unpleasant stimuli (unpleasant regulate,
UR). The respective condition was indicated by an instruction cue,
either the capital letter A (representing the German word for to
watch: anschauen) or the capital letter R (representing the German
word for to regulate: regulieren, here in the sense of reappraise).
Conditions (NW, UW, UR) varied in pseudorandom order across
trials. Each trial started with a 2-s cue, followed by 2-s picture
presentation. The next trial started after an inter-trial interval
(black screen) randomly varying between 2 and 2.5 s in length.(6) At the end of the MEG-measurement, the participant was asked
to report the strategies used in the emotion regulation task. Subjects
most often reported to have used self-instructions/verbalization like
“This is not a real scene, it is from a movie,” or “The injured person
will be helped.” Thus, themanipulation check veriﬁed that all partic-
ipants had used the cognitive reappraisal strategies trained before
the experiment.
MEG data acquisition and analyses
The MEG (magnetoencephalography) was recorded using a
148-channel whole-cortex magnetometer (MAGNES 2500 WH, 4D
Neuroimaging, San Diego, USA). Data were sampled at a rate of
678.17 Hz and ﬁltered with a 0.1–200 Hz bandpass ﬁlter. The head
position was monitored using ﬁve coils (nasion, inion, Cz, left and
right ear canal) and by head shape using a Polhemus 3Space Fasttrack.
Signals recorded by elevenMEG reference sensors were used to remove
external, non-biological noise. Further data analysis was conducted
using the FieldTrip open source MATLAB toolbox [51]. The continuous
MEG signal was epoched in trials of 9-s length (5 s pre-stimulus) to
avoid boundary effects in power spectra calculations. Five excessively
noisy sensors were discarded from all participants' analyses. After
rejecting trials containing movement artifacts and superconducting
quantum interference device (SQUID) jumps (based on visual inspec-
tion), the strongest components corresponding to cardiac and eye
movement artifacts were projected out of MEG signal using indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA). Neither groups nor conditions differed
in the number of trials retained (M ± SD per condition: FNS: NW:
65.25 ± 3.84, UW: 64.2 ± 3.82, UR: 64.25 ± 4.68; HC: NW: 64.05 ±
4.49, UW: 64.85 ± 3.75, UR: 64.5 ± 3.74).
Frequency analysis
An estimate of the planar gradient was calculated for eachMEG sen-
sor using a nearest-neighbor method [52]. Time-frequency representa-
tions (2–50 Hz)were obtained on Hanning-tapered timewindowswith
a ﬁxed window length (0.5 s), resulting in a 2 Hz frequency spectral
resolution. Stimulus-evoked activity was estimated as a change of
power relative to a pre-trial baseline −3 s to −2 s, expressed as
percent. Changes were averaged per condition (NW, UW, UR) and per
group (patients with FNS, HC).
Task-induced modulation of oscillatory activity in the time window
from 0.3 s to 2 s after picture onset in the frequency band of 8–12 Hz
were evaluated by cluster-based, dependent-sample t-test with Monte
Carlo randomization (N= 1000) analysis [53]. This procedure controls
for the type I error rate in the context of multiple comparisons. Sensor
clusters were identiﬁed as differentially active when group differences
(patients with FNS vs. HC) between the planned comparisons of
Fig. 2. Time–frequency representation (TFR) of power in the 0–40 Hz frequency range during cue (−2 s to 0 s) and picture presentation (0 s to 2 s). TFRs of power are averaged across all
MEG sensors in percent change from pre-stimulus baseline (−3 s to−2 s); warm colors indicate an increase and cold colors a decrease in power relative to baseline in the respective
frequency range. TFRs are presented separately for each group (HC: healthy control participants; FNS: patients with functional neurological symptoms) for the three conditions: passive
watching of neutral pictures (NW), passive watching of unpleasant pictures (UW) and reappraising the emotional response while watching unpleasant pictures (UR).
1 MNI coordinates for the maximum voxel within the frontal cluster: x =−6, y = 38,
z = 62.
2 MNI coordinates for the maximum voxel within the sensorimotor cluster: x =−55,
y =−10, z = 50.
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targeted the emotion effect, comparing NW and UW, passive watching
of unpleasant versus neutral stimuli, and the regulation effect, compar-
ingUWandUR, passivewatching versus down-regulation of unpleasant
stimuli [33]. Group differences between these effects were evaluated
using independent-sample t-test statistics. The same statistical analyses
were conducted in the time window from−1 s to 0 s before stimulus
onset. Here, the comparison of the response to the cues R (regulate)
and A (passive watch) was deﬁned as the preparation effect.
The source reconstruction of potential generators of the sensor level
effects was realized using a dynamic imaging of coherent sources
beamformer (DICS; [54]) after deﬁning a time-frequency window
based on sensor space data (Fig. 2). Cross-spectral density matrices of
all three conditions per groupwere calculated using amultitaper meth-
od with a center frequency of 10 ± 2 Hz for a time period of 0.3 s to 2 s
after stimulus onset. For each subject, a realistically shaped, single-shell
headmodel [55]was computed, either based on an individual structural
MRI scan (available for 6 patients with FNS and 8 HC) or based on an
afﬁne transformation of an MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute)
template brain (http://www.bic.mni.mcgill.ca/brainweb). Dependent-
sample t-test statistics were used for testing differences in source
power varying with the emotion effect and the regulation effect 0.3 s
to 2 s after picture onset. In addition, independent-sample t-tests
compared the effects between groups (patients with FNS vs. HC) within
the same time window. Analyses used two-sided testing with an
α-signiﬁcance level set to .05.
Results
Alpha power modulation during the cue interval
Time–frequency spectrograms (Fig. 2) and the time course of power
(Fig. 3A) indicate a decrease in power in the 8–12Hz (alpha) range from
pre-trial baseline (−3 s to−2 s) during the 2-s cue (A or R, watch or
regulate) that announced the respective task (watch or regulate). In
HC, this decrease was larger upon the cue that signaled subsequent im-
plementation of emotion regulation strategies compared to the cue that
signaled passive watching (preparation effect; nonparametric statistical
contrasts, p b .01). Patients with FNS did not show this preparation
effect. On group level, a cluster-based nonparametric permutation testveriﬁed the larger differential cue-induced alpha-power modulation in
HC compared with patients with FNS (p b .05, time-window−1 to 0 s
before picture onset).Alpha power modulation during the picture interval
Time–frequency spectrograms (Fig. 2) and time course of power
(Fig. 3A) illustrate further alpha power decrease (8–12 Hz) 0.3 s to 2 s
after picture onset relative to pre-trial baseline (−3 s to−2 s). In HC,
a marginally signiﬁcant emotion effect (p= .06) indicated a tendency
of greater alpha power decrease upon unpleasant relative to neutral
stimuli, while a signiﬁcant regulation effect (p b .01) conﬁrmed greater
alpha power decrease when HC implemented emotion regulation
compared to passivewatching of unpleasant pictures. In contrast, a pro-
nounced emotion effect of greater alpha power decrease whenwatching
unpleasant relative to neutral pictures (p b .01), but no regulation effect
was veriﬁed in patients with FNS. A cluster-based nonparametric per-
mutation test showed group-speciﬁc differential alpha-power modula-
tion 0.3 s to 2 s after picture onset in a central posterior sensor cluster
(p b .05).
Source analyses veriﬁed a group-speciﬁc topography of task-induced
alpha powermodulation (p b .05; Fig. 3B): Bilateral frontocortical alpha
power decrease upon down-regulation was greater in HC than in
patients with FNS, whereas patients with FNS exhibited a strong regula-
tion effect in the left central region corresponding to sensorimotor
cortex. This activity pattern did not differ between patients with
(n= 6) and without (n= 14) additional signiﬁcant comorbid depres-
sion and/or anxiety (assessed by SCL-90-R; see Supplemental Fig. 1).
The (smaller) frontocortical alpha power decrease1 varied with (larger)
FNS severity (r = .32, p = .04), and the (larger) sensorimotor
alpha power decrease2 varied with (larger) FNS severity as a trend
(r =−.29, p = .07). Source activity related to the emotion effect did
not differ between groups.
Fig. 3.A: Time course of power in the 8–12 Hz band expressed as change (in percent) from pre-stimulus baseline (−3 s to−2 s). Time courses of power changes during cue (−2 s to 0 s),
and picture interval (0 s to 2 s) are averaged per group (HC: healthy control subjects; FNS: patients with functional neurological symptoms) and separately for the three conditions: pas-
sively attending to neutral (neutral watch, NW), or unpleasant pictures (unpleasant watch, UW), and regulating emotion to unpleasant stimuli (unpleasant regulate, UR). Gray-shaded
areas mark the interval of power modulation by condition, i.e., the preparation effect (−1 s to 0 s; light gray) and the regulation effect (0.3 s to 2 s; dark gray). B: Source reconstruction
of power for regions of statistical differences between the conditions and groups, respectively, projected onto a schematic cortical sheet (top view). Only voxels with differences at p b .05
signiﬁcance level are presented. Left andmiddle: regulation effect per group (patientswith FNS andHC); negative t-values represent larger decreases in alphapower (0.3 s to 2 s) frompre-
cue baseline (−3.7 s to−2 s). Right: groupdifferences (FNS–HC) in regulation effect; negative t-values represent larger differences in alpha-power decrease in regulation effect in patients
with FNS than in HC, positive values represent greater differences in alpha-power decrease in regulation effect in HC than in patients with FNS.
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Before the emotion regulation task, neither the transcutaneous stim-
ulation intensity level perceived ﬁrst (perception threshold) nor the rat-
ing of stimulation intensity as uncomfortable (discomfort threshold)
differed between groups (perception threshold: patients with FNS:
Mdn = 6.5, IQR 5–7.75; HC: Mdn = 5, IQR 5–7; discomfort threshold:
patients with FNS: Mdn = 12, IQR 9–15; HC: Mdn = 10.5, IQR 9–13).
After the emotion regulation, discomfort threshold in patients with
FNS was lowered compared to HC (U = 107, z = −2.57, p = .01,
r=−0.41).
FNS intensity change
After the emotion regulation task patients with FNS reported
more intense symptoms than before (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
Z=−3.44, p= .001, r=−0.54).
Discussion
Can emotion processing convert into sensorimotor activity? Early
models (e.g. Charcot, Janet and Freud) explained this shift of emotional
to somatic sensations in FNS as conversion of intra-psychic conﬂicts into
physical symptoms, and thus as a ‘defense mechanism’ [5,6,56,57]. At
that time, themechanism of this conversionwas only vaguely described
as “cerebral imbalance”.
It is conceivable that the transfer from cognitive/emotional to
somatosensory systems is manifest in an altered involvement of
sensorimotor and frontocortical regions during emotion processing.
The present study addressed this potential involvement by comparing
oscillatory activity in a standard emotion regulation task, together
with effects on peripheral somatic sensation in participants with
(patients) and without (healthy comparison) FNS.
Imaging studies employing similar tasks veriﬁed that emotion regu-
lation is associated with prefrontal and subcortical activity [34,58]. Inthe present study, patientswith FNS andHCalike practiced cognitive re-
appraisal as an emotion regulation strategy, but only HC showed the
frontocortical activity that usually accompanies cognitive reappraisal.
Although patients with FNS exhibited an intact ‘emotion effect’, that is,
unaffected processing of emotionally arousing stimuli, they did
not show a frontocortical ‘regulation effect’. This lack of frontal alpha
power modulation during emotion regulation may indicate reduced
cognitive control in patients with FNS compared to HC. In the present
study, patients with FNS already showed less alpha power modulation
than HC during the preparation interval. This suggests that patients
with FNS were less efﬁcient in preparing down-regulation of emotions,
when confrontedwith unpleasant stimuli.Whether this indicates a cog-
nitive deﬁcit (getting ready to apply cognitive reappraisal strategies
upon the respective cue) or the dominance of arousal by unpleasant
stimuli cannot be concluded from the present data. For movement
preparation, Vuilleumier ([7], referring to [17,18,59]) assumed that an
altered interplay between limbic and prefrontal structures due to
altered “self-relevant affective representations and memories” (p. 333)
might mediate altered responses on motor tasks in patients with pre-
dominant motor FNS.
Despite the lack of frontocortical activity patients with FNS
showed sensorimotor activity modulation during the present emo-
tion regulation task — and thus no lack of emotion regulation capac-
ity, but rather a different pattern of cortical correlates. Efforts to
control upcoming feelings by cognitive reappraisal prompted the in-
volvement of sensorimotor areas in patients with FNS in contrast to
frontocortical areas in HC. This involvement of sensorimotor net-
works was speciﬁcally related to the down-regulation of upcoming
negative feelings and not to the processing of emotionally arousing
stimuli per se. This argues against a general inability of emotion reg-
ulation, and nonspeciﬁc somatic arousal or muscle tension induced
by an emotional task or the experimental setting. It rather suggests
an imbalance of frontocortical-sensorimotor involvement in the ef-
fort to regulate negative emotions. The sensorimotor activity during
emotion regulation in patients with FNS was prominent in the left
hemisphere. Since no motor response was required, this lateralized
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peractivity of left-hemispheric sensorimotor regions could not be at-
tributed to predominantly right-sided motor symptoms, as motor
and sensory symptoms were equally distributed among patients
and between body sides. Motor preparation (unlike motor response
execution) has been reported to be intact in patients with FNS [7,16].
It cannot be concluded whether a left-hemispheric dominance of
alpha power modulation can be related to the rehearsal of cognitive
reappraisal strategies in patients with FNS (cf. [60]), since cognitive
strategy implementation was not quantiﬁed for correlation analyses.
In the present study, self-rated alexithymia was used as additional
measure of altered emotion processing in patients with FNS: Would
altered emotion regulation as evident in oscillatory activity patterns in
an experimental emotion regulation design be evident in a particular
perception and expression of one's own emotions?Whereas alexithymia
has been reported in individuals expressing FNS, somatization and/or
dissociative disorders [10,11,61,62], only three patients of the present
sample displayed above-threshold [48,49] alexithymia scores. Moreover,
no relationships between alexithymia (TAS-26) scores, somatic discom-
fort threshold or oscillatory activity patterns were found in the present
study. This might result from the sample selection (unusually low on
alexithymia), and that the low alexithymia scores compromised the sta-
tistical veriﬁcation of a relationship. Alternatively, it might indicate that
self-rated alexithymia and experimentally controlled emotion regulation
tackle different aspects of emotion processing: The emotion regulation
task can be supposed to stimulate more cognitive effort to control emo-
tional arousal, whereas the TAS-26 as a self-report instrument screens
the ability to identify or describe feelings and the amount of externally
oriented thinking.
After the emotion regulation task, the somatic discomfort threshold
was lower than before task onset in patients with FNS, and patients
reported increased symptom intensity. It is tempting to relate these
changes in somatic sensations to the task-induced sensorimotor activity
as both represent somatic activity, in an effort to down-regulate nega-
tive emotions. This activity patternmay reﬂect the altered emotion pro-
cessing characteristic for FNS. The concerted sensorimotor and somatic
activity during emotion regulation in patients with FNS strengthens the
hypothesis of a link between emotion and somatic processing in
medically unexplained neurological symptoms, and offers a psycho-
physiological delineation of a conversion of (aversive) feelings into
(aversive) somatic sensations in FNS. If conﬁrmed in further, larger sam-
ples, this would identify the psychophysiological model of conversion
assumed (but not veriﬁed) in earlier models [5,6].
Alternative explanations have to be considered: Task-induced
sensorimotor activity and altered somatic sensations may be consid-
ered a consequence of arousal and tension prompted by the experi-
mental setting or comorbid psychopathology in patients. Patients
with FNS have been reported to exhibit comorbid depression and
anxiety (e.g., [63]). In the present study, patients expressed greater
general distress than HC (Supplemental Table 1). However, the
symptom severity of comorbid depression and/or anxiety did not af-
fect the task-induced alpha power modulation. It is possible that the
greater effort that patients invested in the emotion regulation task
augmented individual symptom intensity, somatic sensitivity (to
TENS) and sensorimotor activity.
Conclusions from the present results are limited by the small sample
size and the cross-sectional design, which does not justify conclusions
on the origin of altered emotion processing in patients with FNS or on
the origin of the hypothesized conversion. However, the demonstrated
imbalance of frontocortical and sensorimotor activity speciﬁcally relat-
ed to emotion regulation in patients with FNS provides a basis for psy-
chophysiological modeling of a conversion of (aversive) feelings into
(aversive) somatic sensations in FNS, thereby substantiating a hypothe-
sis more than a century old. Advancing our understanding of how emo-
tion processing is linked to body sensations and symptoms should
inﬂuence the adjustment of diagnostics and treatment strategies.Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2015.10.009.
Conﬂicts of Interest
The authors have no conﬂict of interest.
Funding
Research was supported by the University of Konstanz and the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (STE 2263/2–1).
Acknowledgments
We thank Tzvetan Popov, David Schubring, Britta Westner and
Christian Wienbruch for their helpful advice on data analysis, and
Nathalie Arndt, Katharina Haag, Johanna Kienle, Ursula Lommen,
Eva-Maria Schlichtmann, Sebastian Schuster, and Eglantina Udech for
their support of data collection. Additionally, we thank the medical
and psychotherapeutical teams of the Psychotherapeutic Neurology
section, Kliniken Schmieder Konstanz and Gailingen, for their support
of patient recruitment. Thank you also to the Lurija Institute of the
Schmieder Foundation and the University of Konstanz for making this
project possible.
References
[1] M.J. Edwards, J. Stone, A.E. Lang, From psychogenic movement disorder to functional
movement disorder: it's time to change the name, Mov. Disord. 29 (7) (2014)
849–852.
[2] J. Stone, A. Carson, M. Sharpe, Functional symptoms and signs in neurology: assess-
ment and diagnosis, J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 76 (Suppl. 1) (2005) i2–12.
[3] M. Crommelinck, Neurophysiology of conversion disorders: a historical perspective,
Neurophysiol. Clin. 44 (4) (2014) 315–321.
[4] S. Freud, The aetiology of hysteria, in: A. Strachey, A. Tyson, trans (Eds.), The Stan-
dard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 1953–1974,
Hogarth Press, London 1896, pp. 191–221.
[5] K. Kozlowska, Healing the disembodied mind: contemporary models of conversion
disorder, Harv. Rev. Psychiatry 13 (1) (2005) 1–13.
[6] P. Janet, The Major Symptoms of Hysteria, The Macmillan Company, New York,
1907.
[7] P. Vuilleumier, Brain circuits implicated in psychogenic paralysis in conversion
disorders and hypnosis, Neurophysiol. Clin. 44 (4) (2014) 323–337.
[8] K. Roelofs, P. Spinhoven, Trauma and medically unexplained symptoms towards an
integration of cognitive and neuro-biological accounts, Clin. Psychol. Rev. 27 (7)
(2007) 798–820.
[9] R.J. Brown, A.N. Danquah, E. Miles, E. Holmes, E. Poliakoff, Attention to the body in
nonclinical somatoform dissociation depends on emotional state, J. Psychosom.
Res. 69 (3) (2010) 249–257.
[10] B. Demartini, P. Petrochilos, L. Ricciardi, G. Price, M.J. Edwards, E. Joyce, The role of
alexithymia in the development of functional motor symptoms (conversion disor-
der), J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 85 (10) (2014) 1132–1137.
[11] A. Steffen, J. Fiess, R. Schmidt, B. Rockstroh, “That pulled the rug out from under my
feet!” — adverse experiences and altered emotion processing in patients with
functional neurological symptoms compared to healthy comparison subjects, BMC
Psychiatry 15 (2015) 133.
[12] S. Aybek, T.R. Nicholson, O. O'Daly, F. Zelaya, R.A. Kanaan, A.S. David, Emotion–
motion interactions in conversion disorder: an FMRI study, PLoS One 10 (4)
(2015), e0123273.
[13] V. Voon, C. Brezing, C. Gallea, R. Ameli, K. Roelofs, W.C. LaFrance Jr., et al., Emotional
stimuli and motor conversion disorder, Brain 133 (Pt 5) (2010) 1526–1536.
[14] C. Subic-Wrana, M.E. Beutel, A. Knebel, R.D. Lane, Theory of mind and emotional
awareness deﬁcits in patients with somatoform disorders, Psychosom. Med. 72
(4) (2010) 404–411.
[15] O. Pollatos, B.M. Herbert, S. Wankner, A. Dietel, C. Wachsmuth, P. Henningsen, et al.,
Autonomic imbalance is associated with reduced facial recognition in somatoform
disorders, J. Psychosom. Res. 71 (4) (2011) 232–239.
[16] V. Voon, Functional neurological disorders: imaging, Neurophysiol. Clin. 44 (4)
(2014) 339–342.
[17] Y. Cojan, L.Waber, A. Carruzzo, P. Vuilleumier, Motor inhibition in hysterical conver-
sion paralysis, NeuroImage 47 (3) (2009) 1026–1037.
[18] Y. Cojan, L. Waber, S. Schwartz, L. Rossier, A. Forster, P. Vuilleumier, The brain under
self-control: modulation of inhibitory and monitoring cortical networks during
hypnotic paralysis, Neuron 62 (6) (2009) 862–875.
[19] J.J. Gross, The emerging ﬁeld of emotion regulation: an integrative review, Rev. Gen.
Psychol. 2 (3) (1998) 271–299.
[20] J.J. Gross, Emotion regulation: affective, cognitive, and social consequences, Psycho-
physiology 39 (3) (2002) 281–291.
483J. Fiess et al. / Journal of Psychosomatic Research 79 (2015) 477–483[21] A.D. Craig, Human feelings: why are some more aware than others? Trends Cogn.
Sci. 8 (6) (2004) 239–241.
[22] A.R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain,
Grosset/Putnam, New York, 1994.
[23] D.L. Perez, B.A. Dworetzky, B.C. Dickerson, L. Leung, R. Cohn, G. Baslet, et al., An
integrative neurocircuit perspective on psychogenic nonepileptic seizures and func-
tional movement disorders: neural functional unawareness, Clin. EEG Neurosci. 46
(1) (2015) 4–15.
[24] Interoceptive sensitivity and sense of body ownership in patients with functional
neurological symptoms. BNA, in: L. Ricciardi, B. Demartini, L. Crucianelli, M.J.
Edwards, A. Fotopoulou (Eds.),Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry,
2014.
[25] A.M. Accarino, F. Azpiroz, J.R. Malagelada, Selective dysfunction of mechanosensitive
intestinal afferents in irritable bowel syndrome, Gastroenterology 108 (3) (1995)
636–643.
[26] J.W. Pennebaker, The Psychology of Physical Symptoms, Springer Verlag, New York,
1982.
[27] D. Ciofﬁ, Beyond attentional strategies: cognitive-perceptual model of somatic inter-
pretation, Psychol. Bull. 109 (1) (1991) 25–41.
[28] W. Rief, A.J. Barsky, Psychobiological perspectives on somatoform disorders,
Psychoneuroendocrinology 30 (10) (2005) 996–1002.
[29] J.S. Moser, J.W. Krompinger, J. Dietz, R.F. Simons, Electrophysiological correlates of
decreasing and increasing emotional responses to unpleasant pictures, Psychophys-
iology 46 (1) (2009) 17–27.
[30] M.A. Parvaz, A. MacNamara, R.Z. Goldstein, G. Hajcak, Event-related induced frontal
alpha as a marker of lateral prefrontal cortex activation during cognitive reappraisal,
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 12 (4) (2012) 730–740.
[31] J.W. Krompinger, J.S. Moser, R.F. Simons, Modulations of the electrophysiological re-
sponse to pleasant stimuli by cognitive reappraisal, Emotion 8 (1) (2008) 132–137.
[32] G. Hajcak, A. MacNamara, D.M. Olvet, Event-related potentials, emotion, and emo-
tion regulation: an integrative review, Dev. Neuropsychol. 35 (2) (2010) 129–155.
[33] C. Pietrek, T. Popov, A. Steffen, G.A. Miller, B. Rockstroh, Neuromagnetic indication of
dysfunctional emotion regulation in affective disorders, Depress. Res. Treat. 2012
(2012) 156529.
[34] T. Popov, A. Steffen, N. Weisz, G.A. Miller, B. Rockstroh, Cross-frequency dynamics of
neuromagnetic oscillatory activity: two mechanisms of emotion regulation, Psycho-
physiology 49 (12) (2012) 1545–1557.
[35] G. Buzsaki, B.O. Watson, Brain rhythms and neural syntax: implications for efﬁcient
coding of cognitive content and neuropsychiatric disease, Dialogues Clin. Neurosci.
14 (4) (2012) 345–367.
[36] O. Jensen, A. Mazaheri, Shaping functional architecture by oscillatory alpha activity:
gating by inhibition, Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4 (2010) 186.
[37] M. Ackenheil, G. Stotz, R. Dietz-Bauer, A. Vossen, Mini International Neuropsychiat-
ric Interview (German Version 5.0.0), Psychiatrische Universitätsklinik München,
München, Germany, 1998.
[38] R.C. Oldﬁeld, The assessment and analysis of handedness: the Edinburgh inventory,
Neuropsychologia 9 (1) (1971) 97–113.
[39] E.R. Nijenhuis, P. Spinhoven, R. Van Dyck, O. Van der Hart, J. Vanderlinden, The
development and psychometric characteristics of the somatoform dissociation
questionnaire (SDQ-20), J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 184 (11) (1996) 688–694.
[40] C. Mueller-Pfeiffer, S. Schumacher, C. Martin-Soelch, A.P. Pazhenkottil, G. Wirtz, C.
Fuhrhans, et al., The validity and reliability of the German version of the somatoform
dissociation questionnaire (SDQ-20), J. Trauma Dissociation 11 (3) (2010) 337–357.
[41] L.R. Derogatis, Self-Report Symptom Inventory. Internationale Skalen für
Psychiatrie. Scalaru CIP, Editor, Weinheim, Beltz, 1986.
[42] L.R. Derogatis, K.L. Savitz, The SCL–90–R and Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) in pri-
mary care, in: M. Maruish (Ed.), Handbook of Psychological Assessment in Primary
Care Settings, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, Mahwah, NJ, US 2000,
pp. 297–334.[43] A. Hessel, J. Schumacher, M. Geyer, Symptomcheckliste SCL-90-R: testtheoretische
überprüfung und normierung an einer bevölkerungsrepräsentativen stichprobe,
Diagnostica. 47 (2001) 27–39.
[44] G.H. Franke, SCL-90-R. Die Symptom-Checkliste von Derogatis, Deutsche Version
(Manual), Göttingen, Beltz Test GmbH, 2002.
[45] R.M. Bagby, J.D. Parker, G.J. Taylor, The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale—I.
Item selection and cross-validation of the factor structure, J. Psychosom. Res. 38
(1) (1994) 23–32.
[46] R.M. Bagby, G.J. Taylor, J.D. Parker, The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale—II.
Convergent, discriminant, and concurrent validity, J. Psychosom. Res. 38 (1)
(1994) 33–40.
[47] J. Kupfer, B. Brosig, E. Brahler, Testing and validation of the 26-item Toronto
Alexithymia Scale in a representative population sample, Z. Psychosom. Med.
Psychother. 46 (4) (2000) 368–384.
[48] F. Pedrosa Gil, M. Nickel, N. Ridout, M.J. Schwarz, C. Schoechlin, R.
Schmidmaier, Alexithymia and interleukin variations in somatoform disorder,
Neuroimmunomodulation 14 (5) (2007) 235–242.
[49] J. Kupfer, B. Brosig, E. Brahler, Totonto-Alexithymie-Skala-26, Deutsche Version,
Göttingen, Hogrefe Verlag, 2001.
[50] P.J. Lang, M.M. Bradles, B.N. Cuthbert, International Affective Picture System (IAPS):
Instruction Manual and Affective Ratings (Tech. Rep. No. A-6), University of Florida,
The Center for Research in Psychophysiology, Gainesville, FL, 2005.
[51] R. Oostenveld, P. Fries, E. Maris, J.M. Schoffelen, FieldTrip: open source software for
advanced analysis of MEG, EEG, and invasive electrophysiological data, Comput.
Intell. Neurosci. 2011 (2011) 156869.
[52] M.C. Bastiaansen, T.R. Knosche, Tangential derivative mapping of axial MEG applied
to event-related desynchronization research, Clin. Neurophysiol. 111 (7) (2000)
1300–1305.
[53] E. Maris, R. Oostenveld, Nonparametric statistical testing of EEG- and MEG-data,
J. Neurosci. Methods 164 (1) (2007) 177–190.
[54] J. Gross, J. Kujala, M. Hamalainen, L. Timmermann, A. Schnitzler, R. Salmelin,
Dynamic imaging of coherent sources: studying neural interactions in the human
brain, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98 (2) (2001) 694–699.
[55] G. Nolte, The magnetic lead ﬁeld theorem in the quasi-static approximation and its
use for magnetoencephalography forward calculation in realistic volume conduc-
tors, Phys. Med. Biol. 48 (22) (2003) 3637–3652.
[56] C.R. Cloninger, M. Dokucu, Somatoform and dissociative disorderseditors in: S.H.
Fatemi, P. Clayton (Eds.), The Medical Basis of Psychiatry, Humana Press 2008,
pp. 181–194.
[57] C. Spitzer, S. Barnow, H.J. Freyberger, H.J. Grabe, Recent developments in the theory
of dissociation, World Psychiatry 5 (2) (2006) 82–86.
[58] J.T. Buhle, J.A. Silvers, T.D. Wager, R. Lopez, C. Onyemekwu, H. Kober, et al., Cognitive
reappraisal of emotion: a meta-analysis of human neuroimaging studies, Cereb.
Cortex 24 (11) (2014) 2981–2990.
[59] V. Voon, C. Brezing, C. Gallea, M. Hallett, Aberrant supplementary motor complex
and limbic activity during motor preparation in motor conversion disorder, Mov.
Disord. 26 (13) (2011) 2396–2403.
[60] P.C. Fletcher, C.D. Frith, P.M. Grasby, T. Shallice, R.S. Frackowiak, R.J. Dolan, Brain sys-
tems for encoding and retrieval of auditory-verbal memory. An in vivo study in
humans, Brain 118 (Pt 2) (1995) 401–416.
[61] H.J. Grabe, S. Rainermann, C. Spitzer, M. Gansicke, H.J. Freyberger, The relationship
between dimensions of alexithymia and dissociation, Psychother. Psychosom. 69
(3) (2000) 128–131.
[62] A.K. Mattila, E. Kronholm, A. Jula, J.K. Salminen, A.M. Koivisto, R.L. Mielonen, et al.,
Alexithymia and somatization in general population, Psychosom. Med. 70 (6)
(2008) 716–722.
[63] J. Stone, A. Carson, R. Duncan, R. Roberts, R. Coleman, C. Warlow, et al., Which neu-
rological diseases are most likely to be associated with “symptoms unexplained by
organic disease”, J. Neurol. 259 (1) (2012) 33–38.
